Abstract: This thesis addresses the timely concern of protecting privacy in the age of big data. We identify the two following problems as the fundamental problems in computational privacy: (i) consistently quantifying privacy in different systems and (ii) optimally protecting privacy using obfuscation mechanisms. We cast the problem of quantifying privacy as computing the estimation error in a statistical (Bayesian) inference problem, where an adversary combines his observation, background knowledge and side channel information to estimate the user's sensitive information. This enables us to evaluate privacy of users in different systems, and consistently compare the effectiveness of different privacy protection mechanisms. We also formulate the problem of optimizing user privacy while respecting data utility as an interactive optimization problem (Bayesian Stackelberg game), where both user and adversary want to maximize their own objectives which are in conflict with each other. We apply our methodologies to quantifying and protecting location privacy in location-based services. We also provide an opensource tool, named Location-Privacy and Mobility Meter (LPM), that enables researchers to learn and analyze human mobility models as well as evaluating and comparing different location-privacy preserving mechanisms.
Introduction
Recent developments in information and communication technologies have been profound and life-changing. Most people are now equipped with smart phones with high computation power and communication capabilities. These devices can efficiently run multiple software applications in parallel, store a non-negligible amount of (personal) user data, process various sophisticated sensors and actuators, and communicate over multiple wireless media. Furthermore, they are commonly equipped with high-precision localization capabilities based, for example, on a GPS receiver or on triangulation with nearby base stations or access points. Mobile applications take advantage of this feature to provide location-based services to users.
The ever-increasing usage of these personal communication devices and mobile applications, although providing convenience to their owners, comes at a very high cost to their privacy. Interacting with location-based services (LBSs) leaves an almost indelible digital trace of users' whereabouts. Moreover, the contextual information attached to these traces can reveal users' personal habits, interests, activities, and relationships. Consequently, exposure of this private information to third parties (such as service providers) escalates their power on individuals, and opens the door to various misuses of users' personal data.
Individuals have the right, and should also have the means to control the amount of their private (location) information that is disclosed to others. In the context of location-based services, various privacy enhancing mechanisms, such as location obfuscation and user anonymization, are proposed in the literature. However, the existing design methodologies for location-privacy preserving mechanisms do not consistently model users' (privacy and service quality) requirements together with the adversary's knowledge and objectives. Protection mechanisms are instead designed in an ad hoc manner and irrespective of the adversary model. Consequently, there is a mismatch between the goals and results of these protection mechanisms. Furthermore, the evaluation of privacy preserving mechanisms and their comparison remain problematic because of the absence of a systematic method to quantify them. In particular, the assumptions about the adversary model tend to be incomplete, with the risk of a possibly wrong estimation of the users location privacy. Arguably, the lack of a generic analytical framework for specifying protection mechanisms and for evaluating location privacy is evident. The absence of such a framework makes the design of effective protection mechanisms and the objective comparisons between them impossible.
In this thesis, we address these issues and provide solutions for a systematic quantification and protection of location privacy. To this end, we construct an analytic framework for location privacy. We formalize users' mobility model, their access pattern to location-based services, and their privacy and service quality requirements. We also model location-privacy preserving mechanisms as probabilistic functions that obfuscate users' (location and identity) information before being shared with location-based services. Moreover, in order to quantify users' location privacy, we propose inference mechanisms that measure users' information leakage to third parties. They combine various pieces of information about users and estimate (by establishing a probabilistic belief on) users' private information (e. g., their location at a given time). Therefore, we propose the adversary's expected estimation error as, arguably, the right metric for location privacy.
In our inference framework, we formalize the adversary's prior knowledge on users, his observation (on the users' accesses to LBS), and his inference objectives (e. g., re-identifying or localizing users). We assume that adversary constructs a (mobility) profile for each user, to be used in his inference attacks. We make use of statistical tools to construct these profiles, given users' partial traces. Moreover, we model the inference attacks as the estimation of users' actual locations, given their profiles and their LBS accesses (observed by the adversary). We mainly use Bayesian inference to perform the estimation. In particular, we use known inference algorithms for hidden Markov models to design de-anonymization, localization, and tracking attacks. To cover more adversary's objectives, we propose an algorithm for generic location inference attacks, based on Markov-chain Monte-Carlo methods.
We also provide a software tool: the Location-Privacy and Mobility Meter (LPM).¹ It is designed based on our formal framework for evaluating the effectiveness of various location-privacy preserving mechanisms and quantifying users' location privacy. As an example, using LPM, we validate the efficacy of existing location obfuscation and anonymization mechanisms on real location traces. We show that users' location privacy measured by existing popular metrics, k-anonymity and entropy, is not cor-related with the adversary's success (in learning users' private information), thus these metrics are inappropriate as privacy metrics. Our results also confirm that anonymization alone is a weak location-privacy preserving mechanism. Moreover, our results show how the resilience of a protection mechanism varies with respect to different inference attacks. Hence, it is a necessity for privacy protection mechanisms to be designed with concrete attack objectives in mind.
Relying on these findings, we design optimal location obfuscation techniques tailored against localization attacks. A user needs a protection mechanism that maximizes her location privacy. This is at odds with the objectives of the adversary who designs inference attacks that minimize his estimation error. We propose a gametheoretic methodology that models the conflicting objectives of user and adversary simultaneously. More precisely, we model the problem as a Bayesian Stackelberg game and solve it by using linear programming. In the optimization problem, users constrain the protection mechanism to respect their service quality requirements. This enables us to find the optimal point in the tradeoff curve between privacy and service quality that satisfies both user privacy and service quality requirements. Our results indicate that anticipating for the inference attacks and considering the adversary's knowledge lead to the design of more effective protection mechanisms.
This thesis is a step towards a more systematic modeling, analysis, and design of (location) privacy enhancing technologies. We believe that our analytical approach can be used to quantify and protect privacy in scenarios and domains that are not covered in this thesis.
Quantifying location privacy
Our goal is to make progress on the quantification of the performance of a location-privacy preserving mechanism (LPPM). This is an important topic, because (i) people are notoriously bad estimators of risks in general, and privacy risks in particular, (ii) it is the only way to make meaningful comparisons between different LPPMs and (iii) the research literature is not yet mature enough on the topic.
In specific areas, several contributions have been made to quantify privacy, be it for databases [8] , for anonymity protocols [4] , or for anonymization networks [7, 20, 27, 28] . Yet, in the field of location privacy, notwithstanding many contributions from different disciplines (such as databases, mobile networks, and ubiquitous computing [16] ) for protecting location privacy, the lack of a unified and generic formal framework for specifying pro-tection mechanisms and also for evaluating location privacy is evident. This has led to the divergence of contributions and, hence, has caused confusion about which mechanisms are more effective. In general, the adversary model is often not appropriately addressed and formalized, and a good model for adversary's possible inference attacks (while incorporating his background knowledge) is missing. This can lead to a wrong estimation of the location privacy of mobile users. In few cases, that privacy vulnerabilities of sharing location data is discussed, location privacy is evaluated as the anonymity of users [3, 6, 17, 29] . Hence, the amount of location information leakage through sharing location data is not properly quantified. Moreover, the proposed evaluation schemes cannot be extended to generic location-privacy preserving mechanisms.
We propose a generic theoretical framework for quantifying location privacy of LBS users. We make the following contributions.
-We provide a generic model that formalizes the adversary's attacks against private location-information of mobile users. In particular, we rigorously define de-anonymization (re-identifying pseudonymous location traces), localization (finding location of a user at a specific time) and tracking attacks on anonymous traces as statistical inference problems. We also construct a generic attack that discloses even more location-related information about users who expose their (pseudonymous and obfuscated) locations to LBSs. -We rely on well-established statistical methods to evaluate the performance of such inference attacks. More precisely, we rely on Bayesian inference techniques, especially those that are proposed for hidden Markov models. We infer users' private information even if their LBS accesses are pseudonymous and obfuscated. We formalize the adversary's success and we clarify, explain and justify the right metric to quantify location privacy: The adversary's expected estimation error.
-We provide a tool: the Location-Privacy and Mobility
Meter (LPM) is developed based on our formal framework and is designed for evaluating the effectiveness of various location-privacy preserving mechanisms. We use LPM to evaluate various location-privacy preserving mechanisms and to compare their effectiveness under similar settings. -We show the inappropriateness of some existing metrics, notably entropy and k-anonymity, for quantifying location privacy. Figure 1 represents our framework for quantifying location privacy. For quantifying location privacy, the deanonymization attack finds the most likely assignment of users { 1 , 2 , . . ., } to the observed (pseudonymous and obfuscated) traces {õ1, õ2, . . ., õ}. Notice that it is not correct to simply assign each user to the trace that she could have most likely created. This is because doing so more than one user might be assigned to the same trace.
The most likely assignment is a joint assignment; it maximizes the joint probability of assigning all users to the observed traces (pseudonyms). More formally, we compute the following: * = arg max ℙr{Σ = | = o},
where is an assignment of users to pseudonyms, and o is the sequence of observed obfuscated locations.
We use Bayesian inference in order to perform the deanonymization. In order to obtain the most likely assignment * , we need to maximize the following probability:
We compute the likelihood ℙr{õ| } for each pair of observed trace õand user with the Forward-Backward algorithm [19] . This is an inference algorithm for hidden Markov models; it computes the posterior marginals of all hidden state variables given a sequence of observations. Having computed the likelihoods for all pairs of observed traces and users in the bipartite graph, we complete the de-anonymization attack by solving the Maximum Weight Assignment (MWA) problem in this graph, using the Hungarian algorithm.
Given the result of the de-anonymization attack, the localization is the attack in which the adversary computes the probability distribution over regions where a specific user might be at a specific time instant. This probability is computed given the observed traces from users. More formally, the adversary computes ℙr{ = | o} for user at time instant for all regions ∈ R, where is the actual location of user at time .
Then, given the most likely assignment of users to observed traces * , which we computed in (1) Figure 1 : Elements of the proposed location-privacy framework. The users, application, exposure, actual traces, which are then anonymized and obfuscated by the LPPM to produce anonymous observed traces. The attacker uses a set of training traces to create, via the knowledge construction (KC) mechanism, a mobility profile for each user in the form of a Markov Chain transition probability matrix. Having the user mobility profiles and the observed traces, the adversary tries to reconstruct (infer) the actual traces. The only element of the framework not shown here is the metric that evaluates the success of the adversary's reconstruction attack by comparing the results of the attack with the users' actual traces. service quality.
de-anonymization attack, we compute the probability distribution of the given user's location at the given time instant as ℙr{ = | o, Σ = * }, which itself can be computed as ℙr{ = | o, * ( ) =}. We use the Bayesian rule to compute the localization probability
where the numerator probability can be easily computed with the Forward-Backward algorithm. The forward and backward variables are defined to be
,̃( ) = ℙr{o +1:
The variable ,̃( ) accounts for the observations up to time and region at time , and ,̃( ) accounts for the remainder of the observed trace, given that the user's location at time is region . Both these variables can be computed in polynomial time using an iterative algorithm.
The probability ℙr{ = | o, * ( ) =} is then equal to
Finally, having computed ℙr{ = | o, * ( ) =}, we quantify location privacy of user at time as the expected estimation error of the adversary:
where (, ) is the distance between the user's true location and adversary's estimate.
Protecting location privacy
The disclosure of users' whereabouts to the LBS exposes aspects of their private life that is not apparent at first, but can be inferred from the revealed location data [10, 12, 15, 23, 25] . A large body of research has focused on developing location-privacy protection mechanisms (LPPMs) that allow users to make use of LBSs and limit the amount of disclosed sensitive information [1, 5, 9, 11, 13, 14, 18] . These protection mechanisms are based on hiding or perturbing the real locations of a user, or even sending fake locations to the LBS, in order to increase the uncertainty of the adversary about a user's true whereabouts. However, the evaluation of these designs usually disregards the fact that the adversary might have some knowledge about users' access patterns to the LBS and also about the algorithm implemented by the LPPM. As we show in the quantification chapter, such information allows the attacker to reduce his uncertainty on the user's true location. Hence, prior evaluations overestimate the location privacy offered by a protection system. We focus on a broad range of LBSs and location sharing services in which users reveal their location in a sporadic manner, e. g., via applications for location checkin and location-tagging, or via applications for finding nearby points-of-interests, local events, or nearby friends. We consider an adversary interested in uncovering the location of a user at the time she sends the LBS query (i. e., an adversary performing localization attacks). We focus on user-centric LPPMs in which the decisions taken to protect privacy (e. g., hiding, perturbing, or faking the location) are made locally by the user. Hence, these LPPMs can be easily integrated in the mobile device that she uses to access LBS. We note that the principles behind our protection mechanism design are applicable to LBSs where users reveal their location continuously (rather than sporadically), and where the adversary's aim is to track users continuously over space and time.
We propose an analytical framework that allows system designers to find the optimal LPPM against a strategic adversary who, knowing each user's LBS access pattern and the underlying obfuscation algorithm, employs an optimal attack to localize them. The challenge is to design an optimal protection mechanism when the inference attack, dependent on the mechanism being designed, is unknown to the designer. As opposed to making any as- Let be user's location that she wants to share. She can probabilistically map it tõusing obfuscation strategy . Adversary inverts using his inference strategy ℎ and hypothesizes user's true location as. User chooses to maximize her privacy (, ), while preserving her service quality (, ). Given the profile of the user ( ), adversary, however, chooses ℎ to minimize (, ). We suggest solving these conflicting optimization problems using Bayesian Game Theory. The optimal obfuscation mechanism need to be computed offline. It is hence useful and efficient for being used in the existing smart-phones.
sumption about the adversary's inference algorithm (i. e., limiting his power), we co-infer the optimal attack while finding the defense mechanism. Additionally, our methodology constrains the search space to the LPPMs that obfuscate locations in such a way that the quality of the LBS response is not degraded below a threshold imposed by the user, hence required service quality for the user is guaranteed. We assume that the adversary is also aware of this user-specified service quality constraint. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first analytical framework that allows engineers to methodologically integrate adversarial knowledge in the design of optimal user-centric privacy protection mechanisms.
We formalize the problem of finding the optimal LPPM anticipating the optimal inference attack as an instance of a zero-sum Bayesian Stackelberg game. In this game, a leader and a follower interact strategically, with each one's gain being the loss of the other. The leader decides on her strategy knowing that it will be observed by the follower, who will optimize his choice based on this observation. In our scenario, the user is the leader and the adversary is the follower. Then, this game precisely models that the adversary knows the user's choice of protection mechanism and will use this knowledge to improve the effectiveness of his attack. We extend the classic formulation of a Stackelberg game with an additional constraint to ensure that the service quality is satisfactory for the user. This enables us to find the optimal point in the tradeoff curve between privacy and service quality, which satisfies both user privacy and service quality requirements. Figure 2 shows the interaction between the obfuscation mechanism and inference attack as well as the tradeoff between privacy and utility. The problem of optimizing location privacy is the following.
Given (1) a maximum tolerable service-quality loss max imposed by the user as a bound for (.), computed using the quality function (.), and (2) a prior ad-versarial knowledge of the user's profile , the problem is finding the LPPM obfuscation function (.) that maximizes the user's location privacy (defined as adversary's inference error). The solution must consider that the adversary (i) observes the LPPM's output, and (ii) is aware of the LPPM's internal algorithm (.). Hence, the adversary implements the optimal attack ℎ(.) that estimates the true location of the user with the least distortion as measured by (.).
The problem of finding an LPPM that offers optimal location privacy given the knowledge of the adversary is an instance of a zero-sum Bayesian Stackelberg game. In a Stackelberg game the leader, in our case the user, plays first by choosing an LPPM and committing to it by running it on her actual location. The follower, in our case the adversary, plays next by estimating the user's location, knowing the LPPM that the user has committed to. It is a Bayesian game because the adversary has incomplete information about the user's true location and plays according to his hypothesis about this location. It is also an instance of a zero-sum game, as the adversary's gain (or loss) of utility is exactly balanced by the losses (or gains) of the utility of the user: the information gained (lost) by the adversary is the location privacy lost (gained) by the user. We now proceed to define the game adapted to our problem:
Step 0 Nature selects a location ∈ R for the user to access the LBS, according to a probability distribution .
That is, location is selected with probability ( ).
Step 1 Given , the user runs the LPPM (| ) to select a pseudolocatioñ∈R, subject to (.) complying with the service quality constraint.
Step 2 Having observed, the adversary selects an estimated location̂∼ ℎ(|),̂∈ R. The adversary knows the probability distribution (| ) used by the LPPM; he also knows the user's profile , but not the true location .
Final
Step The adversary pays an amount (, ) to the user. This amount represents the adversary's error (equivalently, the location privacy gained by the user).
The above description is common knowledge to both the adversary and the user. They both aim to maximize their payoff, i. e. the adversary tries to minimize the expected amount that he will pay, whereas the user tries to maximize it. We show that this game can be solved using the following linear program [24] . Choose (| ),, ∀ ,̃in ∑ (| ) = 1, ∀ (12) (| ) ≥ 0, ∀ ,̃ (13) Inequalities (10) are the series of linear constraints for ensuring maximum privacy for the user, one series for each value of; inequality (11) reflects the service quality constraint; constraints (12) and (13) reflect that (| ) is a probability distribution function.
Conclusions
This thesis [22] is a strong step towards a better understanding and analysis of threats against users' location privacy. It also provides solutions for protecting their location privacy in the context of location-based services. The follow-ups of these solutions are used to design optimal obfuscation mechanisms in more advanced settings [2, 21, 26] .
